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Abstract 
I examine bank loan loss provisioning behaviour during election years - focusing on the effect of elections 
on banking sector loan loss provisioning. The findings reveal that the banking sectors in developed 
countries have higher loan loss provisions in election years. Income smoothing is present in election years 
which supports the income smoothing hypothesis. Also, banking sectors with high capital levels have higher 
loan loss provisions. Although there were no significant differences in bank loan loss provisioning during 
election years across the four bloc, the EU banking sectors and the banking sectors of BIS member-countries 
generally have higher loan loss provisions while the non-EU banking sectors and the banking sectors of the 
G7 member-countries generally have fewer loan loss provisions. 
Keywords: loan loss provisions; income smoothing; election; banks; credit risk, nonperforming loans, 
institutional factors, corruption,  
JEL Classification: G21, G28. 
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1. Introduction 
Political candidates borrow money from banks to fund election campaigns, and there is the risk that loans 
for election campaigns may not be repaid or may be repaid later than the expiry date of the loan. If the 
borrower wins the election, banks often respond to this by writing off such loans or by restructuring the 
loans for delayed repayment of interest and principal. Whichever is done, the banks would have to increase 
loan loss provisions due to change in loan quality. After the candidate has won the election, the lending 
bank(s) can write off the loans with the expectation that the ruling party will, in return for the kindness 
shown by the bank, create a favourable business environment for the lending bank(s). If banks predict that 
the borrower(s) will lose the election after the loan had been disbursed to the borrower(s), banks would 
have already set-aside some loan loss provisions to mitigate this risk since banks are aware that it is difficult 
to compel politicians to pay their debt, which could lead to loan defaults, requiring banks to keep higher 
provisions. Furthermore, even when banks do not give loans to fund election campaign, banks will still 
increase general provisions in response to election uncertainties that may affect the loan portfolio of banks 
in the banking sector.  
The above shows the potential effect of election events on bank financial reporting through loan loss loans 
and its overall effect on the banking sector. Yet, prior studies have not considered the effect of election 
events on bank provisioning. Prior studies show that loan loss provisions (LLPs) are important accruals in 
banks and are used to cover expected losses arising from the lending activity of banks (Curcio and Hasan, 
2015; Leventis et al, 2011). LLPs have a signaling effect in the financial statements of banks in that they 
convey valuable information on the quality of banks’ loan portfolio, and LLP can have significant effects 
on reported earnings and regulatory capital (Ozili and Outa, 2018). The current level of loan loss 
provisioning in banks is significantly influenced by both prudential regulation requirements, which 
emphasize higher provisioning, and accounting standard setting which emphasize greater transparency of 
banks’ financial statements (Bushman and Williams, 2012). Given the focus on financial stability by bank 
regulators, bank regulators favour forward-looking provisioning, which allow banks to account for loss 
events that are expected but have not yet occurred and to build a buffer in anticipation of future losses and 
to enhance the stability of the bank capital over time (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003). 
This paper investigates bank provisioning behavior during election years during the 1998 to 2016 period. I 
explicitly investigate the impact of the election-year on bank provisioning at the country level, while 
controlling for the level of political stability, corruption control and other factors. The ability to manipulate 
loan loss provisions derives mainly from the discretion that managers have in determining the appropriate 
level of provisions to set aside for their current exposures in their loan book. Ideally, the bank manager 
would consider a number of credit risk factors affecting the loan and will assign a credit risk weight to each 
risk factor. The risk weight would be higher if the risk is considered to be material. One risk that bank 
managers may consider alongside other credit risk factors is the effect of elections on banks’ ability to 
recover loans from politically-connected obligors as well as the effect of elections on banks’ ability to 
conduct business. I call this the ‘election year’ effect. The ‘election year’ becomes a country risk factor 
which banks will take into account if banks believe that a change in the current government following 
general elections may affect their ability to recover loans from politically-connected obligors. Such banks 
will keep additional loan loss provisions to mitigate the ‘election year’ effect which is also a type of country 
risk. Surprisingly, the extant literature has not examined the characteristics of bank financial reporting 
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during election year despite the fact that banks are often the largest borrowers to fund election campaigns 
in most countries, and there is the risk that the loans issued to campaign borrowers may not be repaid in 
full, or at worst, will be written off. The findings reveal that the banking sectors in developed countries 
have higher loan loss provisions in election years, and there is evidence of income smoothing during 
election years. Also, banking sectors that have high capital levels also have higher loan loss provisions, 
among other findings. 
This study makes three contributions to the literature. Firstly, it contributes to the literature that examine 
the role of loan loss provisions for effective risk management (e.g., Jin et al, 2018; Ozili and Outa, 2017; 
Cohen et al, 2014). By focusing on loan loss provisions, I provide insights to understand how the level of 
bank provisions may be driven by the need to set-aside additional provisions ‘buffer’ to mitigate other risks 
emanating from bank lending other than the usual obligor-related credit risk factors. Secondly, this study 
contributes to the literature that investigate the influence of external and institutional factors on bank 
financial reporting behaviour (e.g., Ozili, 2019a; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). By controlling for election year effect, political stability and level of 
corruption, I provide insights to understand how unique factors in a country can influence the behavior of 
loan loss provisions in banks. Thirdly, this study examines the behavior of loan loss provisioning in the 
banking sectors of developed economies where elections are more regular, transparent and free from 
structural barriers, which makes it a natural setting to test the effect of election-year on banks financial 
reporting, focusing on loan loss provision in this study. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Loan loss provisions are classified into its discretionary and non-discretionary components. Non-
discretionary loan loss provisions are credit-related factors that drive the level of loan loss provisions while 
discretionary loan loss provisions are other non-credit considerations and opportunistic considerations that 
drive the level of provisions. Although the main function of LLPs is to cover expected credit losses, they 
can be manipulated to pursue other managerial objectives such as income smoothing (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
Balla and Rose, 2015), capital management (Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Leventis et al., 2011; Ozili, 2015) 
and signaling of bank’s financial strength (Kanagaretnam et al, 2005; Anandarajan et al, 2007), among 
others. 
Prior studies have examined bank loan loss provisioning under several contexts and under certain events 
but none of these studies have considered the effect of the election event on bank provisioning. For instance, 
Leventis et al (2011) examine the discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions for listed European 
banks, and find that earnings management (using loan loss provision) was prevalent among 91 listed EU 
banks but this behavior was significantly reduced after the implementation of the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS). Kilic et al (2012) examine the impact of SFAS 133 on the informativeness of 
loan loss provisions for banks in the US. They find that banks used loan loss provisions for income 
smoothing purposes which reduced the informativeness of loan loss provision estimates. El Sood (2012) 
considered the effect of financial crises on the ability of banks to use loan loss provisions to smooth income. 
P.K. Ozili  2020 
 
5 
 
Using a sample of 878 US bank holding companies from 2001 to 2009, the findings reveal that US banks 
use provisions to smooth income when they are meet the minimum regulatory capital ratio, when they are 
in non-recessionary periods, and when they are more profitable. Olszak et al (2017) examine the cyclicality 
of loan loss provisions in the EU, and find that loan loss provisions are procyclical in large, publicly-traded 
and commercial banks, however, strong capital standards and better investor protection weakened the 
procyclicality of LLP. 
Marton and Runesson (2017) examine the predictive ability of loan loss provisions with respect to actual 
losses under IFRS and local GAAP standards. They find that loan loss provisions in IFRS bank-years 
predict future credit losses to a lesser extent than in local GAAP bank-years. Local GAAP also performed 
relatively better than IFRS in large, and in profitable, banks; however, the benefits of local GAAP are 
largely limited to high-enforcement settings. Cummings and Durrani (2016) investigate the effect of the 
Basel Accord capital requirements on banks provisioning and show that bank managers use their discretion 
in setting the level of loan loss provisions to dampen the impact of fluctuations in credit market conditions 
on their lending activities. Ozili (2018) investigates the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss 
provisions in Africa and show that bank loan loss provision is a positive function of non-performing loans 
up to a threshold beyond which bank provisions will no longer increase as non-performing loans increases. 
Ozili (2019b) also examine the relationship between loan loss provisions and bank intangibles among 
African banks and show that higher discretionary loan loss provisions are associated with few intangible 
assets in banks, but the inverse association is weakened in environments with strong investor protection. 
Bratten et al (2017) examine whether banks’ use of the loan loss provision to manage earnings is influenced 
by the extent to which banks hold assets subject to fair value reporting and the use of an industry specialist 
auditor. They find that banks with a greater proportion of assets subject to fair value reporting (i.e., higher 
fair value exposure) use less LLP-based earnings management techniques but more transaction-based 
earnings management (i.e., earnings management achieved by timing the realization of gains or losses. 
They also find that banks engaging industry specialist auditors use less LLP-based earnings management. 
Murcia et al (2016) examine the determinants of loan loss provisions and delinquency ratios for 554 banks 
from emerging market economies (EMEs), and find that bank loan loss provisioning in emerging market 
economies respond mostly to aggregate (macro-) variables, and very little to idiosyncratic (bank-specific) 
factors. Curcio and Hasan (2015) find that non-Euro Area credit institutions use loan loss provisions for 
income smoothing purposes more than for capital management and signaling purposes. 
Country-specific studies also report some determinants of the level of loan loss provisions. In the United 
States, Morris et al (2016) examine the economic determinants and value relevance of US banks’ loan loss 
provisions during the global financial crisis. They find that discretionary provisions are used for smoothing 
and signaling when the two incentives reinforce each other, but smoothing occurs more frequently. 
Kanagaretnam et al (2005) show that US banks use loan loss provisions to signal information about banks 
future prospects but the propensity to use provisions for signaling purposes is greater among smaller banks. 
In Italy, Caporale et al (2018) examine the determinants of loan loss provisions among 400 Italian banks 
during 2001 to 2015. They find that loan loss provisions in Italian banks were significantly influenced by 
the non-discretionary components of loan loss provisions. However, the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions was less pronounced for local banks because their loans were well collateralized and their 
behaviour was more strongly affected by supervisory activity. In China, Wang et al (2019) examine whether 
bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s banking system, and find that non-
discretionary loan loss provisions have a significant impact on credit fluctuation whereas discretionary loan 
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loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation for Chinese banks. In South Africa, Ozili 
and Outa (2018) show that South African banks do not use LLPs to smooth income when they are: under-
capitalized, have large non-performing loans and have a moderate ownership concentration; however, using 
LLP to smooth income is pronounced when South African banks are more profitable during economic boom 
years, when they are well-capitalized and is pronounced among banks that adopt IFRS and have a Big 4 
auditor. In Poland, Borsuk (2019) conducted a set of stress test scenarios to determine how different 
economic scenarios would affect loan loss provisions among other financial ratios. Borsuk find that 
economic growth, the labour market and market interest rates have a significant influence on the loan loss 
provision ratio of banks in Poland. In Uruguay, Gambetta et al (2016) focused on the regulatory reporting 
of loan loss provisions to bank supervisors. They suggest that data analytics such as enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) system and the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) have great benefits to 
improve bank’s reporting of loan loss provisions by banks in Uruguay. Generally, the evidence for the 
determinants of loan loss provisions are mixed in the literature, yet the extant literature has not examined 
the effect of elections on the financial reporting and performance of banks both at the bank-level and at the 
country-level. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Data was obtained for 35 developed countries. The countries were chosen based on the United Nation’s list 
of developed countries1. Developed countries were used in the study because developed countries have 
more regular elections compared to developing countries and transition economies. Also, developed 
economies do not experience coup (i.e., overthrow of government) or dictatorship that prevent elections 
from taking place, meanwhile all these are prevalent in transition economies and in developing economies.  
Financial statement data for the countries were obtained from the World bank database. Some financial data 
were available while other financial data were not available but were computed as a derivative of two or 
more available data. The sample period covers the 1998 to 2016 period and is sufficient to cover at least 5 
election cycles. Data for real gross domestic product growth rate was collected from the World Economic 
Forum archived in the World Bank database while institutional data was collected from the World 
Governance Indicators database of the World bank. Election data was obtained from public sources such 
as government websites, Wikipedia and other public sources. See Appendix 1 for source of data and variable 
description.  
3.2. Methodology 
The baseline model to estimate the behavior of loan loss provisions during election years is given below. 
The model below is a modified version of the models used in prior literature (see Curcio and Hasan, 2015; 
Jin et al, 2018; Ozili, 2019; Wheeler, 2019).  
                                                          
1
 The UN List of developed countries can be found here: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2019_BOOK-ANNEX-en.pdf 
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑃𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖, 𝑡+  𝑒 … … … … .1 
Where,  
LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans in the banking sector of each country 
NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans in the banking sector of each country 
ELECT = a binary variable that equal one in election years and zero in non-election years 
CRISIS = a binary variable that equal one in a banking or financial crisis year and zero otherwise 
∆GDP = real domestic product growth rate in each country 
CC = control of corruption index, the higher the better 
PS = political stability / absence of terrorism index; the higher the better 
LAW = rule of law index, reflecting the quality of legal system and enforcement; the higher the better. 
LG = ratio of credit provided to the private sector by banks as a share of GDP in each country 
t = year 
i = country 
The model above expressed loan loss provisions ratio as a function of non-discretionary2 LLP determinants 
(NPL & ∆GDP) and other external determinants (political factors and institutional factors). 
The LLP ratio is the dependent variable, and was derived by multiplying the NPL ratio data with the loan 
loss coverage ratio data obtained from the World bank, using the formula below:  𝐿𝐿𝑃 / 𝐺𝐿 =  (𝑁𝑃𝐿 / 𝐺𝐿)  ∗  (𝐿𝐿𝑃 / 𝑁𝑃𝐿) 
Where NPL ratio = nonperforming loans divided by gross loan; the loan loss coverage ratio = actual amount 
of loan loss provisions divided by actual amount of nonperforming loans.  
For the explanatory variables, the ELECT variable is the main variable of interest because it captures the 
election years in developed country in the sample. A positive sign for the ELECT coefficient is expected if 
the banking sector substantially increase its level of provisions in response to election uncertainties that 
may affect the loan portfolio of banks in the banking sector. For instance, banks that have high exposure to 
political debtors may experience difficulties in compelling politicians to pay their debt, which could lead 
to loan defaults, requiring banks to keep higher provisions.  
For the control variables, prior studies control for the non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions 
(e.g. Ahmed et al, 1999; Ozili and Outa, 2017). The nonperforming loan (NPL) variable is introduced into 
the model to control for bank provisioning in response to increasing bad loans. Prior literature shows that 
                                                          
2
 Other non-discretionary LLP determinants that were used in prior literature include: loan to asset ratio, loan charge-
offs, loan growth etc, and these variables are only observable at bank-level but not at country-level. This is reason 
why only the NPL and ∆GDP variables have been used in this study as non-discretionary determinants of LLP in the 
LLP modeling in equation 1. 
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banking sectors that have high nonperforming loans will keep higher provisions (see Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Ozili and Outa, 2017); thus, a positive sign is predicted for the NPL 
coefficient. The real gross domestic product growth rate (ΔGDP) variable is introduced into the model to 
control for bank provisioning along the economic cycle. Generally, the banking sectors tend to have fewer 
provisions during good economic times and higher provisions during bad economic times. This expectation 
is consistent with prior studies that show that banks keep fewer provisions in economic boom periods 
because they expect fewer loan defaults in good times, and keep more provisions in recessionary periods 
because the probability of default is higher during bad times (see Laeven and Majnoni, 2003, Ozili, 2018); 
implying a negative relationship between ΔGDP and LLP. The total loan to GDP (LG) ratio is introduced 
into the model to reflect the extent to which the economy is driven by private credit. The LG ratio measures 
the amount of credit provided to the private sector by banks as a share of GDP. Banks in highly credit-
driven economies would normally keep higher general provisions to mitigate contemporaneous credit risk 
in their loan portfolio, thus, a positive relationship between LLP and LG is expected. The LG ratio is derived 
mathematically by multiplying the credit to deposit ratio data with the bank deposit to GDP data in the 
World bank database, using the formula below. 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 / 𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 / 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇)  ∗  (𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇 / 𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
Next, it is important to control for the impact of the prevailing political environment on elections which can 
affect the banking sector. To do this, I introduce three institutional factors (the corruption control (CC), rule 
of law (LAW) and the political stability (PS) indicators) that play a significant role during elections. 
Corruption levels and political instability have been considered to be detrimental to general elections 
(Dupas and Robinson, 2012; Callen and Long, 2015), and there is also some evidence that strong legal 
systems can improve election outcomes (Gibson et al, 2003). The PS variable is introduced into the model. 
Higher values of PS indicate greater political stability, and a negative relationship between LLP and PS is 
expected because, Ghosh (2016) show that banks in politically unstable environments tend to perform 
poorly - they have low profitability and higher nonperforming loans; in such environments, banks would 
keep higher provisions to cover expected losses that may arise from political instability. For the CC variable, 
a negative relationship between LLP and CC is expected because banks in highly corrupt environments will 
experience higher nonperforming loans (Goel and Hasan, 2011), requiring banks to keep higher loan loss 
provisions. Higher values of CC indicate greater control of corruption. For the LAW variable, a negative 
relationship between LLP and LAW is expected because banks in strong legal environments are able to use 
the power of the courts to compel debtors to repay their debt which reduces the level of nonperforming 
loans (Cristini et al, 2001), thereby leading to fewer provisions. Higher values of LAW indicate greater 
legal quality and enforcement. Table 1 presents a summary of the expected signs of the variables. Finally, 
the models are estimated using fixed effect regression model. 
(Insert Table 1) 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 report the summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables. Loan loss provisions averages 
2.87% of gross loan. LLPs are higher in the banking sectors of Greece, Cyprus and Romania, and are much 
lower for Canada and Australia. Non-performing loans (NPL) averages 5.18%, and is a double-digit higher 
for Cyprus, Croatia and Italy. The high NPLs indicate that the banking sectors of these countries have low 
asset quality; comparatively, NPLs are lower in the banking sectors of Canada, Luxembourg and Australia. 
ΔGDP, on average, is about 2.42% and is much lower for Greece and Italy and is higher for Lithuania and 
Latvia. Overall, the result from the descriptive statistics suggest that there is wide variation across banking 
sectors in developed countries. 
(Insert Table 2) 
4.1.2. Correlation 
Table 4 report the Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-values. LLPs are positive and 
weakly correlated with the ELECT variable (0.057), however, the correlation between LLP and ELECT is 
not significant. LLPs are negative and significantly correlated with ΔGDP (-0.108*), indicating that 
provisioning in the banking sector is procyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle. The LAW and 
CRISIS coefficients are positive and significantly correlated with LLPs. This indicate that higher loan loss 
provisions are higher in countries that have strong legal enforcement and in countries that experience 
financial crises. The PS and CC coefficients are negatively correlated with LLPs, and indicate that banking 
sectors in political stable and less corrupt environments have fewer provisions. Also, NPL is positively 
correlated with LLPs and indicate that loan loss provisions are higher in banking sectors that experience 
higher nonperforming loans. LG is also negatively correlated with LLPs and indicate that loan loss 
provisions are higher in credit-driven economies. Table 3 report the Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
country variables. 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
4.2.1. Bank Provisioning behavior during election year 
The estimation results are reported in Table 4. The ELECT coefficient is positively significant at the 5% 
level in model (1), indicating that the election year had a positive and significant impact on the loan loss 
provisioning of the banking sector in developed countries. This result implies that the banking sectors of 
developing countries have higher loan loss provisions during election years. The result remains significant 
when the GMM and OLS estimators are used to estimate the model.  
For the control variables, the NPL coefficient is positively significant as expected, and is consistent with 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). This implies that the banking sector of 
developed economies keep more provisions when banks expect higher non-performing loans. The ∆GDP, 
PS and CRISIS coefficients are not significant. The LAW coefficient is negatively significant, and is 
consistent with the apriori expectation that banks in strong legal environments are able to use the power of 
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the courts to compel debtors to repay their debt which reduces the risk of loan defaults, thereby leading to 
fewer provisions. The CC coefficient is also negatively significant, indicating that the banking sectors in 
less corrupt countries have fewer loan loss provisions. The LG coefficient is positively significant at the 
10% level, indicating that the banking sector of highly credit-driven economies have higher provisions. 
This result is consistent with the expectation that credit-driven economies tend to keep higher provisions to 
mitigate contemporaneous credit risk. Finally, some control variables yield different signs when alternative 
estimations are used to estimate the model as shown in model (2) and (3). 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
4.2.2. Classification by Regional and Political Bloc 
Most regional and political blocs require its members to adopt a uniform set of regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms or standards for banking regulation and supervision in member countries. Such uniform 
supervisory mechanisms for member countries may influence the extent of lending and provisioning for 
bad loans in the banking sectors of member countries. Here, I consider the case of member-countries in the 
European Union, the G7 also referred to as ‘most developed economies (MDE), and the member countries 
of the Bank of International Settlement3 (BIS). I estimate the differences in banking sector provisioning 
during election years for EU, non-EU, BIS and G7 countries. Binary variables were used to divide the 
sample into European Union (EU), non-European Union (non-EU), BIS member-countries and the G7 
countries (MDE). The ‘EU’ binary variable is assigned a value of one if the developed country is a member 
of the European union and zero otherwise, the ‘non-EU’ binary variable is assigned a value of one if the 
developed country is not a member of the European union and zero otherwise, and the ‘MDE’ binary 
variable is assigned a value of one if the developed country is a member of the G7 countries.   𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑃𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖, 𝑡+ 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑈𝑖 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑈𝑖 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑖 + 𝑒 … … 2 
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. The EU and BIS coefficient is positively significant at the 
5% level in column 1, which suggest that the EU banking sectors and the banking sectors of BIS member-
countries have higher loan loss provisions. On the other hand, the ‘non-EU’ and ‘MDE’ coefficients are 
negatively significant, which suggest that non-EU banking sectors and the banking sectors of the G7 
member-countries have fewer loan loss provisions. Furthermore, the ELECT*EU, ELECT*Non-EU, 
ELECT*MDE, and ELECT*BIS coefficients are not significant and suggests that there were no significant 
differences in bank provisioning during election years across the four bloc.  
(Insert Table 5) 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The mission of the BIS is to promote monetary and financial stability in the financial system of member countries. 
Sufficient provisioning can act as a cushion to absorb some unexpected losses in abnormal periods, thereby 
contributing to financial stability. 
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4.3. Further analyses 
4.3.1. Income smoothing during election years 
I test the income smoothing hypothesis to determine whether income smoothing using loan loss provisions 
is present in the banking sector of developed countries. The ideal income smoothing variable used in prior 
literature is a bank-level variable measured as ‘earnings before profit and tax divided by total assets’ 
however this variable is unobservable at the country level and therefore cannot be used in the country-level 
analyses in this study. A proxy variable was constructed using the available earnings variables at the 
country-level. The first earnings variable introduced into the model is the before-tax return on assets (ROA) 
variable. The second earnings variable is the net interest margin (NIM) variable. The third earnings variable 
is the provisions-adjusted ROA variable ‘EBTP’ computed using the formula: ROA*(1+LLP/100). The 
purpose of this adjustment is to create a replica of the “earnings before tax and provisions’ variable 
traditionally used in prior literature by adding back provisions into the earnings variable. The fourth 
earnings variable is the provisions-adjusted NIM variable ‘EBTP2’ computed using the formula: 
NIM*(1+LLP/100). The purpose of this adjustment is also to create a corresponding replica of the “earnings 
before tax and provisions’ variable traditionally used in prior literature by adding back provisions into the 
earnings variable. Also, a lagged election year variable (ELECTt-1) is introduced into the model to account 
for any pro-active provisioning in banks ahead of the election year. Banks can increase provisions early in 
the years before the election so that they do not have to keep too much provisions in the actual election 
year. Finally, the earnings variables are interacted with the ‘ELECT’ and ‘ELECTt-1’ variables as shown 
in equation 3 to determine whether determine whether income smoothing using loan loss provisions is 
present in the banking sector of developed countries during and before the election year. The result is 
reported in table 6.  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑃𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖, 𝑡+  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃2 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃2𝑖, 𝑡+  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑒 … … … . .3 
The ELECT*EBTP2, ELECT*NIM ELECTt-1*EBTP2 and ELECTt-1*NIM coefficients are positively 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that income smoothing is present in the banking sectors of 
developed countries. The finding support prior literature that show that banks have some incentive to 
manipulate loan loss provisions estimate for income smoothing purposes (Bushman and Williams, 2012; 
Ozili and Thankom, 2018) 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
4.3.2. Capital Management during election years 
We also test the capital management hypothesis to determine whether capital management using loan loss 
provisions is present in the banking sector of developed countries. The CAR and CAP variables were 
introduced into the model. The CAR variable is the ratio of bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
while the CAP variable is the ratio of bank capital to total assets (%). Subsequently, the CAR and CAP 
earnings variables were interacted separately with the ‘ELECT’ and ‘ELECTt-1’ variables to determine 
whether determine whether income capital management using loan loss provisions is present in the banking 
sector of advanced countries during and before the election. 
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𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑃𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖, 𝑡+  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 +  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑒 
The result is reported in table 6. The ELECT*CAR and ELECT*CAR coefficients are positively significant 
at the 5% level, indicating that banking sectors with high capital levels have higher provisions. This implies 
that banking sectors in developed economies have sufficient provisions even when they are well-
capitalized. However, this finding does not support the capital management hypothesis in the literature. 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
I examined bank provisioning behaviour during election years - focusing on the effect of elections on 
banking sector provisioning. I examined the banking sectors of 35 developed countries from 1998 to 2016. 
The findings reveal that the banking sectors in developed countries have higher provisions in election years. 
Also, income smoothing is present in election years which supports the income smoothing hypothesis. Also, 
banking sectors with high capital levels have higher provisions. Although there were no significant 
differences in bank provisioning during election years across the four bloc, the EU banking sectors and the 
banking sectors of BIS member-countries generally have higher loan loss provisions while the non-EU 
banking sectors and the banking sectors of the G7 member-countries generally have fewer loan loss 
provisions. 
The main message of this paper is that the ‘election year’ is a significant country risk factor to banks because 
the uncertainty about election outcomes may affect the loan portfolio of banks especially when election 
campaigns are funded by loans from the banking sector, requiring banks to keep higher provisions to 
mitigate expected credit losses. 
One implication of the findings is that political events such as elections, can have significant effect on the 
provisioning decisions of banks. More so, political events may affect other accounting numbers in banks 
not only loan loss provisions. Secondly, bank supervisors should consider the ‘election-year effect’ in their 
assessment of the appropriate level of regulatory provisions that banks should keep. One idea is to require 
banks to increase its stock of ‘general provisions’ in election years to act as a cushion to mitigate expected 
and unexpected losses arising from election and post-election events. Thirdly, strong legal and political 
institutions can help to reduce the negative effects of elections on bank stability and performance, therefore, 
policy makers should develop policies that strengthen existing institutions with the appropriate enforcement 
powers. 
Future research should investigate other cross-country events that can affect the stability of the banking 
sector across countries. Future research can also investigate the effect of elections on bank provisioning in 
developing and transition countries. Such future studies should take into account the fact that most 
developing and transition countries either have irregular elections or experience political and military events 
that may prevent elections from taking place. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Description 
Indicator 
Name 
Short definition Source 
LLC Provisions to nonperforming loans (%) Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
∆GDP Gross domestic product growth rate World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files. 
LG Credit to private sector by banks as a share of 
GDP. 
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
CAP Ratio of capital to total asset  
CAR Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
(%) 
 
 
Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
NPL Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%) Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
PS Political stability and absence of terrorism World Governance Indicator in the 
world bank database 
CC Control of corruption World Governance Indicator in the 
world bank database 
LAW Rule of law / quality of legal system World Governance Indicator in the 
World bank database 
ELECT Election year variable Constructed by author 
CRISIS The financial crisis indicator Global financial development indicator 
in the World bank database 
NIM Net interest margin Global financial development indicator 
in the World bank database 
ROA Return on assets, before tax Global financial development indicator 
in the World bank database 
EBTP 1 Income smoothing variable (earnings before 
tax and provisions) 
Constructed by author 
EBTP 2 Another income smoothing variable (earnings 
before tax and provisions) 
Constructed by author 
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Table 1 
Table 1: Information about the variables 
Variable Expected/Predicted Sign Description 
LLP Dependent Variable Loan loss provisions divided by total asset ratio 
ELECT (+) Election year 
NPL (+) Non-performing loans to gross loans ratio 
LG (+) Private credit supply to the economy 
LAW (-) Rule of law / quality of legal system; Rule of law index 
PS (-) Political stability and absence of terrorism index 
CC (-) Corruption control index 
ΔGDP (-) change in real gross domestic product 
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Table 2 
Table 2: Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean values) 
S/N Countries LLP NPL ELECT ∆GDP PS LAW CRISIS CC LG 
1 Canada 0.32 0.88 0.31 2.35 1.07 11.35 0 1.97 105.55 
2 United States 1.06 1.95 0.26 2.28 0.46 10.94 0.36 1.48 51.19 
3 Japan 1.33 3.38 0.36 0.71 1.04 10.58 0.29 1.38 116.22 
4 France 2.59 4.21 0.15 1.56 0.48 10.53 0.29 1.38 86.88 
5 Germany 1.73 3.66 0.26 1.42 0.90 10.47 0.28 1.83 96.48 
6 Italy 4.99 10.24 0.21 0.44 0.54 10.94 0.28 0.28 76.84 
7 United Kingdom 1.24 2.33 0.21 2.032 0.47 10.35 0.35 1.83 - 
8 Norway 0.65 1.212 0.21 1.76 1.29 10.29 0 2.12 88.56 
9 Iceland 3.19 4.66 0.31 3.41 1.36 8.64 0.28 2.08 136.36 
10 Switzerland 0.60 1.52 0.26 1.94 1.33 9.82 0.28 2.09 153.37 
11 Sweden 0.52 1.11 0.26 2.54 1.21 10.35 0.28 2.22 110.81 
12 Spain 2.64 3.47 0.31 2.05 0.02 10.52 0.28 1.09 127.55 
13 Portugal 3.66 5.51 0.21 0.92 0.98 10.23 0.28 1.07 128.28 
14 Netherland 0.73 2.52 0.31 1.77 1.09 10.17 0.28 2.069 114.77 
15 Luxembourg 0.21 0.45 0.21 3.51 1.42 7.65 0.28 1.98 83.93 
16 Ireland 3.70 7.88 0.10 5.37 1.15 9.82 0.28 1.57 104.95 
17 Greece 7.64 14.83 0.26 0.51 0.24 10.52 0.28 0.19 79.34 
18 Finland 0.37 0.54 0.15 1.90 1.45 10.05 0 2.31 72.87 
19 Denmark 1.27 2.36 0.26 1.35 1.11 10.05 0.28 2.36 152.57 
20 Belgium 1.42 2.86 0.26 1.69 0.84 10.17 0.28 1.48 61.51 
21 Austria 1.90 2.65 0.21 1.76 1.16 10.17 0.28 1.74 90.91 
22 Australia 0.34 0.97 0.36 3.19 0.98 10.05 0 1.93 105.79 
23 New Zealand 0.39 1.15 0.32 2.81 1.33 10.24 0 2.30 122.00 
24 Slovenia 4.13 7.22 0.15 2.37 1.04 13.05 0.28 0.91 54.62 
25 Romania 11.43 14.76 0.21 3.32 0.18 14.52 - -0.25 22.80 
26 Poland 5.09 8.89 0.21 3.75 0.71 14.41 0 0.51 37.27 
27 Malta 1.91 7.32 0.21 3.72 1.26 6.88 0 0.86 101.74 
28 Lithuania 3.72 9.21 0.32 4.07 0.75 12.94 0 0.35 34.13 
29 Latvia 3.35 5.27 0.32 3.96 0.53 12.52 0.28 0.26 49.82 
30 Hungary 3.69 6.98 0.21 2.34 0.84 13.94 0.28 0.48 43.94 
31 Estonia 0.84 1.66 0.21 3.76 0.70 13.35 0 1.02 61.34 
32 Cyprus 9.14 24.69 0.21 2.48 0.49 8.47 0 1.05 174.58 
33 Czech Republic 4.47 8.23 0.21 2.55 0.94 13.71 0.21 0.38 42.94 
34 Croatia 5.85 10.05 0.32 1.74 0.55 13.47 0.14 0.08 53.48 
35 Bulgaria 6.05 9.74 0.22 3.19 0.27 14.12 0 -0.15 41.68 
 Total 2.87 5.18 0.25 2.42 0.86 11.01 0.19 1.27 87.14 
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Table 3 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
          
          Variable LLP NPL ELECT ∆GDP PS LAW CRISIS CC LG 
LLP 1.000         
          
          
NPL 0.921*** 1.000        
 (41.31)         
          
ELECT 0.057 0.021 1.000       
 (1.01) (0.36)        
          
∆GDP -0.108* -0.184*** 0.011 1.000      
 (-1.91) (-3.28) (0.19)       
          
PS -0.375*** -0.316*** -0.044 0.052 1.000     
 (-7.09) (-5.83) (-0.77) (0.91)      
          
LAW 0.218*** 0.249*** -0.046 -0.037 -0.329*** 1.000    
 (3.92) (4.52) (-0.81) (-0.61) (-6.11)     
          
CRISIS 0.169*** 0.222*** 0.001 -0.439*** -0.135** 0.143** 1.000   
 (3.01) (3.98) (0.02) (-8.56) (-2.38) (2.54)    
          
CC -0.516*** -0.508*** 0.034 -0.128** 0.587*** -0.561*** 0.060 1.000  
 (-10.56) (-10.34) (0.59) (-2.27) (12.71) (-11.87) (1.06)   
          
LG -0.209*** -0.179*** 0.039 -0.385*** 0.203*** -0.307*** 0.298*** 0.554*** 1.000 
 (-3.76) (-3.19) (0.69) (-7.31) (3.63) (-5.66) (5.48) (11.67)  
          
***, **, * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
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Table 4 
Table 4: Impact of elections on provisioning in the banking sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed effect) GMM OLS 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c 3.164*** 
(3.67) 
- - 
LLPt-1  0.109*** 
(4.96) 
 
ELECT 0.195** 
(2.15) 
0.093*** 
(3.27) 
0.194* 
(1.72) 
NPL 0.448*** 
(30.30) 
0.413*** 
(21.16) 
0.471*** 
(36.91) 
CRISIS 0.142 
(0.86) 
-0.596 
(-1.51) 
-0.113 
(-0.84) 
∆GDP 0.018 
(0.87) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
0.049*** 
(3.00) 
PS -1.146 
(-0.56) 
-1.111*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.464*** 
(-3.11) 
CC -0.187*** 
(-2.83) 
1.0728*** 
(3.45) 
0.122 
(1.16) 
LAW -0.187*** 
(-2.83) 
0.170*** 
(4.00) 
0.028** 
(2.24) 
LG 0.005* 
(1.91) 
0.007 
(1.103) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
    
R2 92.83  99.78 
Adjusted R2 91.42  99.40 
F-statistic 65.33  261.62 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000  0.00004 
J-statistic  13.19  
Prob(J-statistics)  0.51  
No of Observation 
(adjusted) 
309 240 309 
Model (2) is estimated using GMM first difference regression (with ordinary coefficient 
covariance method and tick the box “do not transform period dummies” effects specification). 
Model (1) is estimated using fixed effect regression (with country and year fixed effects). 
Model (3) is estimated using ordinary OLS with no fixed effects. NPL = ratio of 
nonperforming loans to gross loans: the lower the better; ELECT = a binary variable that 
equal one in an election year and zero in non-election year. CRISIS = a binary variable that 
equal one in a financial or banking or economic crisis year and zero otherwise. ∆GDP = real 
domestic product growth rate; CC = control of corruption index: the higher the better; PS = 
political stability / absence of terrorism index: the higher the better; LAW = rule of law index; 
the higher the better. LG = ratio of credit provided to the private sector by banks as a share of 
GDP. LLP = is the one-year lag of the loan loss provisions variable. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level. 
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Table 5 
Table 5: Bank Provisioning during election years in EU, non-EU, BIS and G7 countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C -0.849 
(-1.59) 
-0.562 
(-1.09) 
-0.365 
(-0.69) 
-0.883 
(-1.68) 
-0.862 
(-1.61) 
-0.556 
(-1.07) 
-0.338 
(-0.64) 
-0.921 
(-1.70) 
ELECT 0.219** 
(2.06) 
0.219** 
(2.06) 
0.211** 
(1.99) 
0.195* 
(1.85) 
0.268 
(1.16) 
0.204* 
(1.70) 
0.177 
(1.49) 
0.389 
(0.59) 
NPL 0.458*** 
(32.09) 
0.458*** 
(32.09) 
0.459*** 
(32.26) 
0.465*** 
(32.82) 
0.458*** 
(32.02) 
0.458*** 
(32.02) 
0.459*** 
(32.23) 
0.464*** 
(32.71) 
CRISIS 0.313** 
(2.13) 
0.313** 
(2.13) 
0.372** 
(2.55) 
0.187 
(1.21) 
0.313** 
(2.13) 
0.313** 
(2.13) 
0.375** 
(2.57) 
0.189 
(1.21) 
∆GDP 0.028 
(1.39) 
0.028 
(1.39) 
0.023 
(1.10) 
0.040* 
(1.93) 
0.028 
(1.39) 
0.029 
(1.39) 
0.024 
(1.13) 
0.039* 
(1.89) 
PS -0.591*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.591*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.605*** 
(-4.09) 
-0.465*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.593*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.594*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.615*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.465*** 
(-3.18) 
CC 0.079 
(0.68) 
0.079 
(0.68) 
0.049 
(0.43) 
-0.136 
(-1.11) 
0.081 
(0.69) 
0.081 
(0.69) 
0.051 
(0.45) 
-0.137 
(-1.12) 
LAW 0.078** 
(2.24) 
0.078** 
(2.24) 
0.069** 
(1.97) 
0.017 
(0.43) 
0.077** 
(2.23) 
0.077** 
(2.23) 
0.068* 
(1.94) 
0.017 
(0.44) 
LG 0.003** 
(2.08) 
0.003** 
(2.08) 
0.003* 
(1.68) 
0.004*** 
(2.75) 
0.003** 
(2.07) 
0.003** 
(2.06) 
0.003* 
(1.65) 
0.004*** 
(2.75) 
EU 0.287*** 
(2.22) 
   0.306** 
(2.02) 
   
Non-EU  -0.287** 
(-2.22) 
   -0.305** 
(-2.02) 
  
MDE   -0.286** 
(-2.29) 
   -0.335** 
(-2.26) 
 
BIS    1.003*** 
(2.91) 
   1.039*** 
(2.83) 
ELECT*EU     -0.063 
(-0.24) 
   
ELECT*NON-EU      0.063 
(0.24) 
  
ELECT*MDE       0.165 
(0.62) 
 
ELECT*BIS        -0.199 
(-0.29) 
         
R2 88.24 88.24 88.25 88.39 88.24 88.24 88.27 88.39 
Adjusted R2 87.42 87.42 87.43 87.57 87.38 87.38 87.41 87.54 
F-statistic 108.07 108.72 108.19 109.54 102.59 102.59 102.83 103.99 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 
The Models in Table 5 are estimated using fixed effect regression (with year fixed effects only). GMM estimations could not be 
run due to near-perfect collinearity of the lag variables with the instrumental variables. NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to 
gross loans: the lower the better; ELECT = a binary variable that equal one in an election year and zero in non-election year. 
CRISIS = a binary variable that equal one in a financial or banking or economic crisis year and zero otherwise. ∆GDP = real 
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domestic product growth rate; CC = control of corruption index: the higher the better; PS = political stability / absence of 
terrorism index: the higher the better; LAW = rule of law index; the higher the better. LG = ratio of credit provided to the private 
sector by banks as a share of GDP. EU = a binary variable that equal one if the country is a member of the European Union and 
zero otherwise. Non-EU = a binary variable that equal one if the country is not a member of the European Union and zero 
otherwise. MDE = a binary variable that equal one if the country is a member of the G7 countries according to the UN’s 
classification. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 6 
Table 6: Testing the income smoothing and capital management hypothesis during election years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
C 1.913** 
(2.21) 
1.255 
(1.39) 
-1.896 
(2.22) 
1.356 
(1.48) 
0.817 
(0.76) 
0.814 
(0.77) 
ELECT 0.172 
(1.38) 
-0.207 
(-1.17) 
0.183* 
(1.60) 
-0.215 
(-1.18) 
-0.918* 
(-1.91) 
-0.486* 
(-1.70) 
NPL 0.436*** 
(31.24) 
0.448 
(32.38) 
0.437 
(31.43) 
0.454*** 
(32.44) 
0.449*** 
(29.13) 
0.445*** 
(29.06) 
CRISIS 0.086 
(0.58) 
0.097 
(0.63) 
0.089 
(0.59) 
0.096 
(0.61) 
0.074 
(0.44) 
0.169 
(1.03) 
∆GDP 0.025 
(1.32) 
0.024 
(1.29) 
0.026 
(1.33) 
0.023 
(1.24) 
0.022 
(1.09) 
0.025 
(1.26) 
PS -0.104 
(-0.42) 
-0.007 
(-0.03) 
-0.116 
(-0.48) 
-0.015 
(-0.06) 
-0.078 
(-0.29) 
-0.235 
(-0.86) 
CC -0.417 
(-1.36) 
-0.104 
(-1.53) 
-0.397 
(-1.32) 
-0.498 
(-1.59) 
-0.545* 
(-1.65) 
-0.369 
(-1.09) 
LAW -0.112* 
(-1.77) 
-0.104 
(-1.61) 
-0.110* 
(-1.75) 
-0.107 
(-1.61) 
-0.063 
(-0.88) 
-0.065 
(-0.91) 
LG 0.002 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(0.82) 
0.002 
(0.63) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
0.003 
(1.11) 
EBTP 0.038 
(0.93) 
     
EBTP2  0.216*** 
(3.91) 
    
ROA   0.056 
(1.29) 
   
NIM    0.203*** 
(3.45) 
  
ELECT(-1) -0.053 
(-0.53) 
-0.417** 
(-2.35) 
-0.036 
(-0.36) 
-0.435** 
(-2.35) 
-0.331 
(-0.76) 
-0.362 
(-1.41) 
ELECT*EBTP -0.065 
(-0.74) 
     
ELECT*EBTP2  0.151** 
(2.41) 
    
ELECT*ROA   -0.091 
(-0.96) 
   
ELECT*NIM    0.158**   
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(2.36) 
ELECTt-1*EBTP -0.042 
(-0.75) 
     
ELECTt-1*EBTP2  0.152** 
(2.39) 
    
ELECTt-1*ROA   -0.067 
(-1.05) 
   
ELECTt-1*NIM    0.163** 
(2.38) 
  
CAR     0.038 
(1.55) 
 
CAP      0.073* 
(1.95) 
ELECT*CAR     0.081** 
(2.28) 
 
ELECT*CAP      0.094** 
(2.37) 
ELECTt-1*CAR     -0.331 
(-0.76) 
 
ELECTt-1*CAP      0.043 
(1.24) 
       
R2 93.90 94.23 93.95 94.04 93.31 93.49 
Adjusted R2 92.49 92.91 92.56 92.69 91.79 92.00 
F-statistic 66.46 71.92 67.82 69.55 61.50 62.57 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
J-statistic       
Prob (J-statistics)       
No of Obs (adjusted) 288 293 291 293 293 290 
Models in Table 6 are estimated using fixed effect regression (with country and year fixed effects). GMM 
estimations could not be run due to near-perfect collinearity of the lag variables with the instrumental 
variables. NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans: the lower the better; ELECT = a binary 
variable that equal one in an election year and zero in non-election year. CRISIS = a binary variable that 
equal one in a financial or banking or economic crisis year and zero otherwise. ∆GDP = real domestic 
product growth rate; CC = control of corruption index: the higher the better; PS = political stability / 
absence of terrorism index: the higher the better; LAW = rule of law index; the higher the better. LG = ratio 
of credit provided to the private sector by banks as a share of GDP. LLP = is the one-year lag of the loan 
loss provisions variable. ELECTt-1 = is the one-year lag of the ELECT variable. EBTP = provisions-
adjusted earnings variable (when loan loss provisions are added back to ROA). EBTP2 = provisions-
adjusted earnings variable (when loan loss provisions are added back to NIM). CAR = ratio of bank 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. CAP = ratio of bank capital to total assets. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level. 
 
